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Barnard, A 2009, 'Comment on ‘To see ourselves as we need to see us: Ethnography’s primitive turn in the early 
Cold War years’ (Edwin N. Wilmsen)' Critical African Studies, vol 1, pp. 61-65. 
 
Commentary 
Alan Barnard 
 
 
I agree with much that Wilmsen says. Indeed, I expressed very similar views not only in ‘The 
lost world of Laurens van der Post?’ (Barnard 1989), but also throughout Anthropology and 
the Bushman (Barnard 2007b, 53-81, 97-111, 129-47). However, I disagree with his implicit 
and simplistic categories of anthropologist as either bad (those who succumbed to the 
primitivist Zeitgeist) or good (those who remained immune to it). I also disagree with his 
simplification of the issues. The traditionalists do not reject historical understanding in favour 
of primitivism or building an us/them dichotomy just for the sake of it. They reject 
Wilmsen’s interpretation of archaeological evidence and documentary sources on the impact 
of culture contact on San peoples. If they have strayed too far towards generalizing 
ethnography, Wilmsen strays too is his occasional misrepresentation of their intentions and 
seemingly deliberate misreading of their ill-chosen phrases. 
 
 
The foraging mode of thought 
 
I shall return to those general issues at the end of this commentary, but let me explain first my 
own position in light of Wilmsen’s specific criticisms of my notion of the foraging, hunter-
gather or Mesolithic mode of thought. My choice of label has always depended on the 
audience and the imagery connoted, which differs greatly in the various countries in which I 
have discussed it: England, Wales, Norway, Japan, and Argentina. It also differs with 
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ethnographic, archaeological, and development studies audiences. The opposite of a foraging 
mode of thought is an accumulation mode of thought. The former is characterized, for 
example, by a preference towards immediate consumption which is associated with sharing, 
and the latter by accumulation associated with saving for one’s dependents. These are 
idealized models. Real societies, and certainly real individuals, at best only approximate these 
representations, and these ideological transitions tend to lag behind changes in means of 
subsistence. My original full formulation of the models was for an audience consisting 
mainly of development practitioners and social scientists interested in development, including 
many from Botswana. What I set out to explain was not the nature of San society, but sets of 
structural inversions apparent in relative oppositions between what I loosely called 
‘accumulation’ thinking (that of development experts) and ‘foraging’ thinking (that of many 
hunter-gatherers and mixed hunter-gatherer-herder-labourers). Similar, but by no means 
identical, ideas are apparent in the distinction James Woodburn (e.g. 1980) makes between 
immediate and delayed-return economies. 
Wilmsen suggests that my notion of the foraging, hunter-gatherer or Mesolithic mode 
of thought is related to that of Lévy-Bruhl. On the contrary, the idea has nothing directly to 
do with Lévy-Bruhl, who in his writings expressed two quite different views of the relation 
between primitive and civilized thought. In most of his books Lévy-Bruhl (e.g. 1926 [1910]) 
held that ‘primitive peoples’ (and he sometimes uses inverted commas on this term himself) 
think logically most of the time and are just as capable as anyone else to solve practical 
problems by thinking through them. However, in his view, their failure to distinguish true 
representations from mystical or symbolic ones leads to an inability to think logically in the 
abstract. Equally, in his view, ‘primitive thought’ reflected collective rather than individual 
thinking, and differs in this regard from ideal ‘civilized thought’, and in particular the thought 
systems of literate peoples, which to Lévy-Bruhl tend allow for more individual variation. 
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Here he was simply following the spirit of his time and place, and in particular the ideas of 
Durkheim and Mauss (e.g. 1963 [1903]) on ‘collective representations’ – a phrase Lévy-
Bruhl uses often in his writings. Lévy-Bruhl’s second theory of ‘primitive thought’ is that 
expressed in his posthumously-published notebooks. There he explicitly rejected his 1910 
statement and substituted a more subtle understanding. In a notebook entry dated 29 August 
1938 he remarks: ‘There is a mystical mentality which is more marked and more easily 
observable among “primitive peoples” than in our own societies, but it is present in every 
human mind’ (Lévy-Bruhl 1975 [1949], 101). 
That said, I would nevertheless admit to a certain parallel in the progression of my 
ideas of the foraging mode of thought and Lévy-Bruhl’s on the primitive mentality. In the 
Notebooks Lévy-Bruhl comments: 
 
If I glance over all I have written on the subject of participation between 1910 
and 1938, the development of my ideas seems clear to me. I started by positing a 
primitive mentality different from ours, if not in its structure at least in its 
function, and I found myself in difficulties in explaining the relationships with the 
other mentality, not only among us but also among ‘primitive peoples’. In short, I 
had only juxtaposed them, without being able to account for either their 
coexistence or their relations. A position which I have never been able to defend 
well, and in the long run an untenable one. By limiting myself to discussing 
mental customs, I took refuge in withdrawal. But the thesis thus extenuated and 
weakened is no more defensible. One will then ask whence these customs arise, 
and how, in themselves, they constitute a ‘mentality’ which, in an inexplicable 
fashion, co-exists with the logical exercise of our mental activity. (Lévy-Bruhl 
1975 [1949], 100) 
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While I do not see ‘mentality’ and ‘mode of thought’ as at all the same thing, and 
certainly do not equate the ‘primitive’ and the ‘foraging’, I can see where others might have 
problems with my terminology. Thomas Widlok (pers. comm.) once suggested I might better 
have described ‘mode of thought’ as ‘ideology’, and in recent work I have tended to favour 
that latter term, or to make plainer the fact that it is ideology (not mentality or mode of 
thought) which is at issue. I have also frequently used instead the phrase ‘foraging ethos’ (in 
contrast to ‘accumulation ethos’). The reason I used ‘mode of thought’ in the first place was 
to hint at yet another opposition, namely the notion of ‘mode of production’. I first pointed 
this out in 1993, towards the end of the Marxist era, when I said that we should turn away 
from production, towards thought, as the driving force of human culture (Barnard 1993, 34). 
Mode of production is not so much ‘means of production plus relations of production’, as in 
classic Marxist understandings, but the ideological, social and material, in that order, in 
interplay with each other. I still stand broadly by that view, although these words may still 
not be quite right to express the meaning.  
Wilmsen cites favourably my paper on van der Post (Barnard 1989), but accuses me 
of switching sides in my work on modes of thought. This is not quite accurate. I never said 
that I was immune from van der Postianism. On the contrary, I admitted that the entire 
subdiscipline of Bushman or San studies is guilty of it. That includes me (see also Barnard 
1996). I argued for a collective reflexivity, and I suggested that we might better understand 
the relation between the people we work with, the imagery we create, and ourselves, if we 
aim for this. My van der Post paper was, like Wilmsen’s one here, primarily about the 
exploration of imagery in ethnography. My later work on the foraging mode of thought was 
quite different. In that I sought to understand relations between two ideologies – the 
articulation of modes of thought, one might say. This is undoubtedly clearest in my first full 
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paper on the subject (Barnard 1998), and the rest might best be thought of as an extension of 
that model to other issues, including the Mesolithic-Neolithic transition.  
In the paper most criticized I state explicitly that there I am concerned ‘not with direct 
ethnographic analogy, but rather with relational analogy’ (Barnard 2007a, 5). Further,  
 
A relational analogy involves comparable archaeological periods, and it involves 
equivalent sets of structural relations. Comparable here means literally compare-
able; it does not mean identical (Barnard 2007a, 5).  
 
Wilmsen cites a figure of mine (Barnard 2007a, 12, Fig. 5) as implying that in the Mesolithic 
mode of thought social equality is natural, and in the Neolithic and later, unnatural. This is 
not true. Admittedly, the chart if read by itself might seem to imply that, but the text of that 
article makes crystal clear that I am talking about how Mesolithic and Neolithic peoples 
construct the meaning of egalitarianism, not whether such a construction truly is either 
‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. Wilmsen’s comments on my reading of Enlightenment and 
Enlightenment-derived texts are, of course, also misplaced. In my Mesolithic paper I was not 
talking about Rousseauian ‘natural inequalities’, but about the social hierarchies Rousseau 
(1984 [1755], 68) called ‘artificial inequalities’. Like Rousseau, I argued that there was a 
clear transition between an egalitarian, hunter-gatherer way of thinking and an inegalitarian, 
post-hunter-gatherer one, with elements of hunter-gatherer thought persisting through the 
transition. Wilmsen therefore misrepresents my Kalahari comparisons and speculations on 
the (late) Northwest European Neolithic. Nor does his paper explain any of the subsistence-
related ideological transitions I referred to (Barnard 2007a, 16-17): knowledge of the 
environment to knowledge of herding and cultivating skills, search for food to search for 
grazing (for herders) or spatial stability (for cultivators), chance of finding meat to guaranteed 
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supply of meat, sharing meat to trading meat, lots of free time to longer working hours, few 
possessions to chance to acquire more, fewer worries about water to more worries, taking 
each day as it comes to planning for the future, a relatively stable supply of food to greater 
fluctuation, and production primarily for one’s own use to production for trade. Far from 
being anti-Enlightenment, oppositions similar to mine on subsistence ideology, 
egalitarianism, and so on, were common in a good deal of 18
th
-century texts on the nature of 
society and of economic systems, both in France and in Scotland (see Barnard 2004) 
 
 
Where does this leave Wilmsen’s argument? 
 
Many of Wilmsen’s points are well made. However, his mocking misrepresentation of the 
views of others does no service to his extremely interesting and, to a degree, valid arguments. 
Wilmsen’s statement (true or false) that ‘the image [of the Bushman] feeds readily into 
racialist discourse’ does not in itself require it to be rendered obsolete. There are other, more 
effective, ways to combat racism than changing one’s ethnography to suit others’ misguided 
perceptions. No-one in San studies denies the power structures which have been present at 
the fringe of San societies for centuries. No-one denies the complex relations among ethnic 
groups. No-one denies that van der Post, Marshall, Lee, Biesele or I construct images through 
our writing. I hope that Wilmsen does not deny that he does the same. It is in the nature of 
ethnography to do so. To abandon ethnography for a de-ethnicized historiography will not 
solve practical problems for San or anyone else. Nor will it purify anthropology. It will just 
turn it into something else.  
What is required is a recognition of the problem, and a collective reflexivity from all 
of us on behalf of the discipline. Lévy-Bruhl had the humility to re-evaluate his own writings 
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in that way. I argued in ‘Laurens van der Post and the Kalahari debate’ (Barnard 1996, 243-
47) that revisionist discourse, as well as traditionalist, is all about the construction of images. 
It is just that these are different images from those of the late 20th-century, traditionalist 
mainstream. Whereas traditionalists emphasize San egalitarianism, revisionists such as 
Wilmsen’s emphasize unequal relations between San and others. If fault is to be found in 
traditionalist discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, it is more with the leaving out of Herero, 
Tswana or Afrikaner presence (as if they occupy a different ecological niche), or simply with 
the now dated language of ‘primitive’, ‘Pleistocene’, ‘simple’, or ‘natural’ in reference to 
Bushmen or San. Yet both these problems were solved at least two and a half decades ago, as 
the various editions of The Dobe !Kung (e.g. Lee 1984, 119-45) make clear. Wilmsen is right 
to draw attention once again to such issues, but he is wrong to think that any of us, including 
Wilmsen himself, can fully escape from at least a degree of easily misread essentialism. Like 
it or not, essentialism remains the basis of any ethnographic generalization.  
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